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Advances in psychology and neuroscience have elucidated the social aspects of human
agency, leading to a broad shift in our thinking about fundamental concepts such
as autonomy and responsibility. Here, we address a critical aspect of this inquiry by
investigating how people consider the socio-relational nature of their own agency,
particularly the influence of others on their perceived control over their decisions and
actions. Specifically, in a series of studies using contrastive vignettes, we examine
public attitudes about when external influences on everyday decisions are perceived
as “undue” – that is, as undermining the control conditions for these decisions
to be considered autonomous – vs. when they are perceived as appropriate and
even supportive of autonomous decision-making. We found that the influence of
preauthorized agents – individuals and institutions with whom we share a worldview –
was judged to be less undue than non-preauthorized agents, even after controlling for
the familiarity of the agent. These effects persisted irrespective of the extent to which
respondents identified as communitarian or individualistic, and were consistent across
two distinct scenarios. We also found that external influences that were rational were
perceived as less undue than those that were arational. Our study opens new avenues
of inquiry into the “folk conception” of autonomy, and we discuss the implications of
our findings for the ethics of public policies designed to influence decisions and for
information sharing in social networks.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent discoveries in psychology and neuroscience have set in motion a broad shift in our
understanding of human agency. Traditionally, our concept of agency has hinged on rational
thinking under the exclusive domain of the individual. Such conceptions are called into question
by findings that highlight the automatic and social dimensions of our cognition. Under certain
circumstances, our thinking and action tends to be “embedded in and dependent upon (features of
our) social environment” (Hurley, 2011, p. 192). This raises important questions about the capacity
to control one’s behavior in such cases and, relatedly, about how we should think about central
human values such as freedom, autonomy, and responsibility.
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There is a burgeoning philosophical literature on these
topics. For instance, some theorists have argued in favor
of reconceptualizing personal autonomy along socio-relational
lines (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000; Oshana, 2006), and the
implications of this reconceptualization for other concepts in
moral and political theory are beginning to be considered
(Christman, 2014; Specker Sullivan and Niker, 2018). There is
also increasing philosophical interest in exploring and integrating
social dimensions into our accounts of moral responsibility
(Vargas, 2013; Hutchison et al., 2018).
In this paper, we focus on a distinct but complementary
aspect of this inquiry: examining how people consider the
socio-relational nature of their own agency, and particularly the
influence of others on their perceived control over their decisions
and actions. Specifically, our study investigates public attitudes
about when certain kinds of external influences on decisions are
perceived as “undue” – that is, as something that undermines
the control conditions for these decisions to be considered
autonomous – vs. when they are perceived as appropriate and
even supportive of decision-making.
While there is general consensus on the “undueness”
of heavy-handed forms of influence like brainwashing and
manipulation (Birks and Chin, 1995), we are interested in how
people perceive of more everyday socio-relational influences
on decisions, such as a news clip on a social media platform,
a friend’s comment or suggestion, a notification from an
app, and so on. These kinds of cases allow us to track
attitudes about the relationship between social embeddedness
and autonomous decision-making. Our studies examine how
this putative tension, between our fundamental sociality and
the ideal of personal autonomy, is negotiated by people
with respect to their day-to-day interactions. In line with
empirical studies that have explored how the public perceives
of beliefs in free will and agency (Shepard and Reuter,
2012; Nadelhoffer et al., 2014) and the influence that such
beliefs may have upon real world behaviors (Shariff et al.,
2014; Protzko et al., 2016; Martin et al., 2017), we anticipate
that our studies of perceptions of undue influence will
open new avenues of inquiry into the “folk conception” of
autonomy.
Our study focuses on two aspects of influences on decisions.
The first examines the rationality status of the influence, a
classic condition for accounts of autonomy. Philosophically,
it is generally accepted that a person needs to have both
adequate capacity and opportunity to evaluate and endorse the
reasons for making a particular decision vis-à-vis her conception
of her desires and wants (Buss and Westlund, 2018). The
psychological and neuroscientific evidence, by contrast, has
shown that many of the cognitive processes that result in
action are less-than-rational, as classically conceived (Felsen and
Reiner, 2011). But how are public attitudes of the undueness of
influences affected by rationality status? We empirically tested
the hypothesis that RATIONAL influences (operationally defined
as those that explicitly offer reasons) are perceived as less
undue than ARATIONAL influences (defined as those that fail to
explicitly offer any reasons) in the context of everyday decision-
making.
The second aspect concerns the relationship between the
influencer and the decision-maker. It has already been well-
established that our decisions are more readily influenced by
agents with whom we (know we) share a worldview than by
those with whom we do not (Cohen, 2003; Kahan and Braman,
2006; Kahan, 2013). We have proposed that, at least in some
cases, this results from our “preauthorizing” the former agents
(Niker et al., 2016). What is not yet known, and what we test
here, is whether perceptions of the undueness of an influence
depend on whether the influencer shares one’s worldview. Thus,
we tested the hypothesis that attitudes about influences depend
on preauthorization status. Specifically, we predicted that an
influence from a PREAUTHORIZED agent, who is known to share
one’s worldview, would be perceived as less undue than the
identical influence from a NON-PREAUTHORIZED agent, who
is not.
We addressed these questions using contrastive vignettes
that systematically varied both rationality and preauthorization
statuses. In support of our hypotheses, we found that the influence
was perceived to be less undue when it was RATIONAL and
when it originated from a PREAUTHORIZED agent. The relative
magnitudes of the effects of rationality and preauthorization
statuses on the perceived undueness of an influence, and
interactions between these factors, depended on the context of
the decision. A follow-up study demonstrated that the effect of
preauthorization depended on having a shared worldview with
the agent, and so could not be explained solely by familiarity.
We suggest that these results support an understanding of
preauthorization as an evaluative stance by which an actor gives
a certain agent preferential access to influencing her decisions.
Specifically, the agent’s influence is incorporated in relevant
future interactions without needing to be consciously evaluated,
and without impacting the actor’s perception of the control she
has over the resultant decision (Niker et al., 2016).
After detailing the methodology and results of our studies in
the next two sections, we describe in the Discussion how our
results inform the folk conception of autonomy, that is, the set
of internal accounts held by the public when they consider the
concept of autonomy (Stich and Ravenscroft, 1994). We also
explore the implications of these results for a range of real-world
debates, such as those over the ethics of public policies designed
to influence decisions (i.e., “nudges”) and information sharing in
social networks.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Respondents from the United States were recruited via Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk. As with other studies using Mechanical
Turk, our sample of respondents was representative of, though
somewhat younger and better educated than, the general
United States population (Paul, 2016; Table 1). Following
acceptance of informed consent, each respondent was randomly
assigned to read one (and only one) of several contrastive
vignettes (Burstin et al., 1980) that asked the respondent to
imagine a scenario (requiring a decision about either voting
or healthy eating) in which an external influence affected
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their decision (Figure 1; see Supplementary Figure S1). The
rationality status of the type of influence and the preauthorization
status of the source of the influence varied across vignettes while
all other aspects of the vignettes were identical; rationality status
was either RATIONAL or ARATIONAL, and preauthorization status
was either PREAUTHORIZED or NON-PREAUTHORIZED. The
respondents then answered a set of questions designed to capture
their attitudes about the extent to which the influence was undue
(“To what extent would you find this influence objectionable?,”
“To what extent would you find this influence manipulative?,”
and “To what extent would you find this influence welcome?”),
quantified on a scale of 1 (“Not at all”) to 100 (“Very
much so”). Responses to each question were highly correlated
(voting scenario: Objectionable vs. Manipulative: r = 0.62,
p < 10−44; Objectionable vs. Welcome: r = −0.62, p < 10−44;
Manipulative vs. Welcome: r = −0.55, p < 10−32; healthy eating
scenario: Objectionable vs. Manipulative: r = 0.55, p < 10−34;
Objectionable vs. Welcome: r = −0.68, p < 10−59; Manipulative
vs. Welcome: r = −0.49, p < 10−26), confirming that these
questions functioned complementarily to capture perceptions of
a unitary concept that we refer to as “undueness.” Since the
only differences between vignettes were the rationality status
and preauthorization status, any differences between groups (e.g.,
the RATIONAL and ARATIONAL groups) in responses to these
questions must be due to the differences between the vignettes
along one of these dimensions (e.g., rationality status; differences
shown in red in Figure 1).
Following these three primary outcome measures, we asked
respondents two questions that allowed us to assess whether
their perception matched the conditions to which they were
assigned [rationality status check: “He offered reasons for why
you should vote against re-electing the mayor” (voting scenario);
“The app provided you with reasons for eating more healthily”
(healthy eating scenario); preauthorization status check: “You
are confident that he shares your worldview” (voting scenario);
TABLE 1 | Demographic characteristics of respondents.
Demographic factor Distribution of respondents
Age Range: 18–72
Median: 33
Mean ± SD: 35.7 ± 11.3
Biological sex Female: 50.8%
Male: 49.2%
Highest education level Some high school: 0.6%
High school diploma: 9.5%
Some college or university: 31.0%
College or university degree: 41.5%
Some post-graduate: 4.2%
Post-graduate degree: 13.2%
Annual household income: <$22,500: 17.0%
$22,500–39,999: 22.6%
$40,000–59,999: 19.4%
$60,000–89,999: 21.4%
$90,000 or more: 17.6%
Prefer not to say: 2.1%
“You are confident that the mission of the Health and Wellness
Center is aligned with your interests” (healthy eating scenario)],
quantified on a scale of 1 (“Strongly disagree”) to 100 (“Strongly
agree”). In addition, after asking respondents “To what extent
would you find this influence objectionable?,” we asked them to
“Please tell us why you answered as you did.” We qualitatively
assessed the responses to this question as an additional check
to further ensure that the respondents understood the vignette,
their assigned condition, and the questions. We also used these
responses, in a previous pilot version of our study, to fine-
tune our vignettes and questions in the present study. Finally,
respondents in the voting scenario were asked, “To what extent
is voting in a mayoral election important to you?,” quantified on
a scale of 1 (“Not very important”) to 100 (“Very important”)
(mean ± SD: 69.5 ± 25.5). We used this response to determine
whether attitudes about influences on voting decisions depended
on whether voting in a mayoral election was considered to
be important. We found that they did not; our overall results
(described below) were unchanged when data from respondents
for whom voting in a mayoral election was not very important
(≤50) were excluded.
A follow-up study replicated the above procedure in order
to examine two potential components of preauthorization
by independently varying familiarity status (FAMILIAR vs.
UNFAMILIAR) and worldview status (SHARED WORLDVIEW vs.
UNKNOWN WORLDVIEW) in a modified version of the voting
scenario.
We then asked respondents to complete a short form that
allowed us to place each respondent on a communitarian-
individualist scale (Kahan, 2012). Finally, we verified
comprehension of the vignettes by asking respondents to
identify the topic of the vignette from a multiple-choice list;
10 respondents with incorrect responses were excluded from
subsequent analysis. Respondents were also excluded for taking
too little (<2 min) or too much (>15 min) time to complete
the experiment (158 respondents excluded). All respondents
were compensated $0.40 for completion of the survey. The
entire set of screens presented to the respondents is provided
(Supplementary Figure S1), and all data included in our analyses
are available as a supplementary dataset (Supplementary Data
Sheet S1).
All analyses were performed in MATLAB; primary built-in
functions used were ttest2, corrcoef, and fitlm. All experiments
were approved by The University of British Columbia Behavioral
Research Ethics Board. All subjects gave written informed
consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
RESULTS
We used contrastive vignettes (Burstin et al., 1980; Felsen et al.,
2013) to examine attitudes about how the type and source
of external influences on decisions affect people’s perceptions
about the undueness of those influences. Each respondent was
presented with a single vignette asking them to imagine a
scenario in which an influence affects an everyday decision
of theirs (see section “Materials and Methods”; Figure 1).
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FIGURE 1 | Contrastive vignettes. (A) The four vignettes used in the voting scenario. All differences between the ARATIONAL (left) and RATIONAL (right) conditions are
shown in red; all differences between the NON-PREAUTHORIZED (upper) and PREAUTHORIZED (lower) conditions are shown in blue. Since questions are identical for all
respondents, any differences in responses between conditions must be due to the differences between vignettes (shown in red and blue). Black text is identical
across all conditions. (B) As in (A), for the healthy eating scenario.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 August 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1400
fpsyg-09-01400 August 7, 2018 Time: 17:35 # 5
Niker et al. Attitudes About Influences on Autonomous Decision Making
In the voting scenario, the respondent’s vote in a mayoral
election is influenced by another person (Figure 1A), while
in the healthy eating scenario, the respondent’s decision
to eat more healthily is influenced by an app on their
smartphone (Figure 1B). In both scenarios, we systematically
varied the context in which the decision is influenced along
two independent dimensions: rationality status (RATIONAL
or ARATIONAL; Figure 1, red) and preauthorization status
(PREAUTHORIZED or NON-PREAUTHORIZED; Figure 1, blue)
(see section “Materials and Methods”). We verified that
respondents’ perception matched the conditions to which they
were assigned based on their responses to the perception
check questions. As expected, responses to the rationality
status check differed between the RATIONAL and ARATIONAL
conditions (voting scenario, p < 10−106; healthy eating
scenario, p < 10−84, two-tailed unpaired t-tests) and responses
to the preauthorization status check differed between the
PREAUTHORIZED and NON-PREAUTHORIZED conditions (voting
scenario, p < 10−73; healthy eating scenario, p < 10−29,
two-tailed unpaired t-tests), confirming the intended contrasts
between our vignettes. Nevertheless, to ensure interpretability
of our results, respondents with mismatched perceptions
(ARATIONAL, >50; RATIONAL, ≤50; NON-PREAUTHORIZED,
>50; PREAUTHORIZED, ≤50) were excluded from subsequent
analysis, resulting in 403 respondents included in the voting
scenario and 428 respondents included in the healthy eating
scenario [although not excluding respondents with mismatched
perceptions revealed that perceived condition predicted attitudes
similarly to assigned condition (Table 2, rows 4–5)]. The
questions that followed each of these vignettes examined the
degree to which the influence was perceived as undue (see section
“Materials and Methods”).
Given the importance of the opportunity for critical reflection
for philosophical accounts of autonomy, we expected that
ARATIONAL influences would be perceived as more undue than
RATIONAL influences. In the voting scenario, the ARATIONAL
influence was indicated by describing how a person sways
the respondent not to vote for the mayor in an upcoming
election “even though he doesn’t offer any reasons” (Figure 1A,
left boxes, red), while the RATIONAL influence was indicated
by describing how the respondent is identically swayed by a
person “offer[ing] up a set of reasons” (Figure 1A, right boxes,
red). As expected, the respondents in the RATIONAL condition
considered the influence to be less Objectionable (p < 10−22,
two-tailed unpaired t-test), less Manipulative (p < 10−8, two-
tailed unpaired t-test), and more Welcome (p< 10−21, two-tailed
unpaired t-test) than respondents in the ARATIONAL condition
(Figure 2A; Figures 3A–C shows effect sizes between each group
of respondents; Table 2, row 1 shows regression weights). In
the healthy eating scenario, an app was described as having a
strong influence on eating habits, and works either by flashing
subliminal images of healthy food that “do not offer you any
reasons for eating more healthily” (ARATIONAL; Figure 1B, left
boxes, red) or by sending text messages several times a day that
offer “reasons for eating more healthily” (RATIONAL; Figure 1B,
right boxes, red). As in the voting scenario, respondents in
the RATIONAL condition again considered the influence to
be less Objectionable, less Manipulative, and more Welcome
than respondents in the ARATIONAL condition (Objectionable:
p < 10−5; Manipulative: p < 10−10; Welcome: p < 0.01, two-
tailed unpaired t-tests; Figures 2B, 3D–F and Table 2, row
1). These data support the idea that people generally perceive
influences that are RATIONAL as less undue, and therefore less of
an infringement on personal autonomy, than influences that are
ARATIONAL.
We next examined how attitudes were affected by
preauthorization status. In the NON-PREAUTHORIZED condition
of the voting scenario, the source of the influence was described
as an acquaintance whose worldview is unknown (Figure 1A,
upper boxes, blue), while in the PREAUTHORIZED condition, the
source of the influence was described as a close friend whose
worldview is aligned with that of the respondent (Figure 1A,
lower boxes, blue). We found that respondents perceived
influences from PREAUTHORIZED sources as less Objectionable,
less Manipulative, and more Welcome than otherwise-identical
influences from NON-PREAUTHORIZED sources (Objectionable:
p < 10−5; Manipulative: p < 10−6; Welcome: p < 10−8,
two-tailed unpaired t-tests; Figures 2C, 3A–C and Table 2,
row 2). For all questions, the effects of preauthorization status
were independent of the effects of rationality status (Table 2,
row 3). In the healthy eating scenario, the source of the influence
was a smartphone app recommended by the respondent’s
local Health and Wellness Center. In the PREAUTHORIZED
condition, the respondent is described as a “health nut” who
regularly uses the Center’s services and is therefore confident
that its mission is aligned with their interests (Figure 1B,
upper boxes, blue). In contrast, in the NON-PREAUTHORIZED
condition, the respondent is described as having never used
the Center’s services, and who therefore does not know
whether its mission is aligned with their interests (Figure 1B,
lower boxes, blue). Respondents again deemed the influence
from the PREAUTHORIZED source as less Objectionable, less
Manipulative, and more Welcome than the same influence from
the NON-PREAUTHORIZED source (Objectionable: p < 10−11;
Manipulative: p < 10−7; Welcome: p < 10−20, two-tailed
unpaired t-tests; Figures 2D, 3D–F and Table 2, row 2). In this
scenario, we found that the extent to which the influence was
perceived to be Manipulative was affected by an interaction
between rationality status and preauthorization status, and there
was a trend toward an interaction in response to the Welcome
question, while there was no interaction in response to the
Objectionable question (Table 2, row 3).
In order to examine the relative strength of rationality status
and preauthorization status on the perceived undueness of an
influence, we visualized the mean responses of all four groups (2
dimensions × 2 conditions) as well as the effect sizes between
pairs of groups (Figure 3). Consistent with the results of our
regression analysis (Table 2, rows 1–2), we found that rationality
status had a somewhat stronger effect in the voting scenario,
whereas preauthorization status had a somewhat stronger effect
in the healthy eating scenario. In the voting scenario, we found
that an ARATIONAL influence from a PREAUTHORIZED source
was perceived as somewhat more undue than a RATIONAL
influence from a NON-PREAUTHORIZED source, and that the
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TABLE 2 | Logistic regression results.
Predictor How Objectionable? How Manipulative? How Welcome?
1 Rationality status V: β = –15 (p < 10−22) V: β = –9.1 (p < 10−9) V: β = 13 (p < 10−22)
H: β = –7.2 (p < 10−5) H: β = –11 (p < 10−10) H: β = 4.0 (p < 0.01)
2 Preauthorization status V: β = –7.1 (p < 10−5) V: β = –7.7 (p < 10−6) V: β = 8.0 (p < 10−9)
H: β = –11 (p < 10−11) H: β = –8.9 (p < 10−7) H: β = 14 (p < 10−19)
3 Rationality status × Preauthorization status V: β = 1.4 (p = 0.31) V: β = 1.2 (p = 0.39) V: β = 0.28 (p = 0.82)
H: β = 0.88 (p = 0.57) H: β = –3.9 (p < 0.05) H: β = 2.9 (p = 0.055)
4 Perceived rationality status V: β = –0.37 (p < 10−10) V: β = –0.19 (p < 10−3) V: β = 0.27 (p < 10−8)
H: β = –0.23 (p < 10−4) H: β = –0.15 (p < 0.01) H: β = 0.02 (p = 0.59)
5 Perceived preauthorization status V: β = –0.26 (p < 10−5) V: β = –0.20 (p < 10−3) V: β = 0.28 (p < 10−7)
H: β = –0.46 (p < 10−15) H: β = –0.22 (p < 10−4) H: β = 0.41 (p < 10−14)
6 Preauthorization status × Communitarian-Individualist score V: β = –5.7 (p = 0.090) V: β = –0.70 (p = 0.83) V: β = –3.2 (p = 0.26)
H: β = –3.1 (p = 0.41) H: β = –0.42 (p = 0.91) H: β = –3.2 (p = 0.38)
7 Preauthorization status × Sex V: β = 0.011 (p = 0.99) V: β = 0.79 (p = 0.59) V: β = –0.45 (p = 0.72)
H: β = 0.49 (p = 0.75) H: β = 0.69 (p = 0.66) H: β = –0.70 (p = 0.64)
8 Familiarity status β = –4.0 (p < 0.01) β = –2.7 (p = 0.056) β = 3.2 (p < 0.05)
9 Shared worldview status β = –7.5 (p < 10−6) β = –6.3 (p < 10−5) β = 8.9 (p < 10−9)
10 Perceived familiarity status β = –0.068 (p = 0.29) β = –0.094 (p = 0.13) β = 0.11 (p = 0.055)
11 Perceived shared worldview status β = –0.24 (p < 10−4) β = –0.27 (p < 10−4) β = 0.35 (p < 10−9)
Rows 1–3: responses to each question were regressed against rationality status (ARATIONAL = –1; RATIONAL = 1; row 1), preauthorization status (NON-PREAUTHORIZED = –1;
PREAUTHORIZED = 1; row 2), and their interaction (row 3). V, VOTING scenario; H, HEALTHY EATING scenario. Rows 4–5: as in rows 1–2, but with responses to perception
check questions (ranging from 1 to 100) instead of assigned conditions as predictors. For this analysis, no respondents were excluded for a mismatch between their
perceived and assigned conditions. Row 6: as in rows 1–3 without rationality status × preauthorization status interaction, and with the communitarian-individualist score
[rescaled from –1 (maximally communitarian) to 1 (maximally individualist)] and preauthorization status× communitarian-individualist interaction as additional predictors.
Row 7: as in rows 1–3 without rationality status × preauthorization status interaction, and with Sex (Female = –1; Male = 1) and preauthorization status× Sex interaction
as additional predictors. Rows 8–9: responses to each question were regressed against familiarity status (UNFAMILIAR = –1; FAMILIAR = 1; row 8) and worldview status
(UNKNOWN WORLDVIEW = –1; SHARED WORLDVIEW = 1; row 9). Rows 10–11: as in rows 8–9, but with responses to perception check questions (ranging from 1 to 100)
instead of assigned conditions as predictors. For this analysis, no respondents were excluded for a mismatch between their perceived and assigned conditions. For all
rows, significant weights (at p < 0.05) are shown in black and non-significant weights are shown in gray.
effect sizes between ARATIONAL and RATIONAL groups were
generally larger than those between NON-PREAUTHORIZED and
PREAUTHORIZED groups (Figures 3A–C). In contrast, in the
healthy eating scenario we found that an ARATIONAL influence
from a PREAUTHORIZED source was perceived as somewhat less
Objectionable and more Welcome than a RATIONAL influence
from a NON-PREAUTHORIZED source, and that the effect sizes
between NON-PREAUTHORIZED and PREAUTHORIZED groups
were generally larger than those between ARATIONAL and
RATIONAL groups for these questions [Figures 3D,F; this pattern
did not hold for perceptions of how Manipulative the influence
was (Figure 3E), although perceived manipulation was affected
by an interaction between rationality status and preauthorization
status (Table 2, row 3)]. Thus, while both rationality status
and preauthorization status affect the perceived undueness of an
influence in each scenario (Figure 2 and Table 2, rows 1–2), the
relative extent to which they do so, and whether they interact,
may be situationally dependent.
After answering our primary questions and perception
checks, respondents were also asked to complete a scale that
maps respondents onto a continuum from “communitarian”
to “individualist” (Kahan, 2012; see section “Materials and
Methods”). We reasoned that more communitarian respondents
might be more sensitive to preauthorization status, i.e., they
would be less likely than individualistic respondents to perceive
an influence from a PREAUTHORIZED source as undue.
Surprisingly, we found that this was not the case: the effect
of preauthorization status was not modulated by score on the
communitarian-individualist scale (Table 2, row 6). We also
found that men were no more likely than women to perceive
an influence from a PREAUTHORIZED source as undue (Table 2,
row 7).
These results support our prediction that perceptions of
otherwise-identical influences are context dependent: RATIONAL
influences are perceived as less undue than those that are
ARATIONAL (Figures 2A,B), consistent with earlier findings that
showed that the public generally prefers overt influences rather
than covert influences (Felsen et al., 2013; Sunstein, 2016a).
In addition, an influence is considered less undue when it is
exerted by a PREAUTHORIZED than a NON-PREAUTHORIZED
source, irrespective of whether the source is an interpersonal
or institutional agent (Figures 2C,D). However, our use of
preauthorization thus far incorporates several related concepts,
notably familiarity (acquaintance or close friend) and worldview
(unknown or shared), which covaried between the NON-
PREAUTHORIZED and PREAUTHORIZED conditions. To what
extent are our findings (Figures 2, 3) due to each of these
components of preauthorization?
In order to dissociate the effects of these components,
we performed another set of experiments using a variant
of the voting scenario in which we systematically varied
the context in which the decision is influenced in the two
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FIGURE 2 | Effect of rationality status and preauthorization status on the extent to which an influence was perceived as undue. (A) In the voting scenario, an
ARATIONAL influence was perceived as more Objectionable (upper), more Manipulative (middle) and less Welcome (lower) than a RATIONAL influence. (B) As in (A), for
the healthy eating scenario. (C) In the voting scenario, an influence from a NON-PREAUTHORIZED source was perceived as more Objectionable (upper), more
Manipulative (middle), and less Welcome (lower) than an influence from a PREAUTHORIZED source. (D) As in (C), for the healthy eating scenario. Error bars ± SEM.
∗p < 0.01, two-tailed unpaired t-test.
independent dimensions of familiarity status (FAMILIAR or
UNFAMILIAR) and worldview status (SHARED WORLDVIEW
or UNKNOWN WORLDVIEW). We examined the degree to
which the influence was perceived as undue via the same
questions as above (i.e., how Objectionable, Manipulative,
and Welcome; see section “Materials and Methods”). We
again used perception checks to verify that respondents’
perception matched the conditions to which they were assigned
[responses to the familiarity status check differed between
the FAMILIAR and UNFAMILIAR conditions (p < 10−73, two-
tailed unpaired t-test); responses to the worldview status
check differed between the SHARED WORLDVIEW and
UNKNOWN WORLDVIEW conditions (p < 10−90, two-tailed
unpaired t-test)]. As above, respondents with mismatched
perception (UNFAMILIAR, >50; FAMILIAR, ≤50; UNKNOWN
WORLDVIEW, >50; SHARED WORLDVIEW, ≤50) were excluded
from subsequent analysis, resulting in 382 respondents [although
not excluding such respondents again revealed that perceived
condition predicted attitudes similarly to assigned condition
(Table 2, rows 10–11)].
We found that the respondents in the FAMILIAR condition
considered the influence to be less Objectionable, less
Manipulative, and more Welcome than respondents in the
UNFAMILIAR condition (Objectionable: p < 0.01; Manipulative:
p < 0.05; Welcome: p < 0.01, two-tailed unpaired t-tests;
Figure 4A and Table 2, row 8). Likewise, respondents in the
SHARED WORLDVIEW condition considered the influence to be
less undue than respondents in the UNKNOWN WORLDVIEW
condition (Objectionable: p < 10−6; Manipulative: p < 10−5;
Welcome: p < 10−9, two-tailed unpaired t-tests; Figure 4B
and Table 2, row 9). These results suggest that familiarity and
worldview are both components of preauthorization, and that
worldview has at least as strong an effect as familiarity on
attitudes about how influences on decisions affect autonomy
(compare magnitudes of regression results between rows 8 and 9,
and between rows 10 and 11).
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FIGURE 3 | Effect sizes between and across rationality status and
preauthorization status conditions. (A) Effect sizes (Cohen’s d) between
groups’ (squares) perceptions of the extent to which the influence was
perceived as Objectionable in the voting scenario. Shading corresponds to
mean group response. NON-P.A., NON-PREAUTHORIZED; P.A., PREAUTHORIZED.
(B,C) As in A, for the extent to which the influence was perceived as
Manipulative (B) and Welcome (C). (D–F) As in (A–C), for the healthy eating
scenario.
DISCUSSION
We provide evidence that perceptions of the undueness
of influences on decisions are context-dependent. When
respondents were presented with otherwise-identical influences,
they perceived those that were RATIONAL to be less undue
than those that were ARATIONAL (Figures 2A,B) and those
that were exerted by a PREAUTHORIZED source as less undue
than those that derived from a NON-PREAUTHORIZED source
(Figures 2C,D). The preauthorization effect was driven both by
familiarity with the source of the influence (Figure 4A), as well as
by shared worldview (Figure 4B), with the latter having at least
as strong of an effect. There are likely additional factors that drive
public attitudes about influences on decision-making, and these
represent fertile ground for future experimental investigation. In
addition, the attitudes that we examined here are likely to vary
across cultures, particularly between those with divergent views
FIGURE 4 | Effect of familiarity status and worldview status on the extent to
which an influence was perceived as undue. (A) An influence from an
UNFAMILIAR source was perceived as more Objectionable (upper), more
Manipulative (middle), and less Welcome (lower) than an influence from a
FAMILIAR source. (B) An influence from a source with an UNKNOWN
WORLDVIEW was perceived as more Objectionable (upper), more Manipulative
(middle) and less Welcome (lower) than an influence from a source with a
SHARED WORLDVIEW. Error bars ± SEM. ∗p < 0.01, two-tailed unpaired t-test.
on the centrality of personal autonomy; these cultural variations
can also be examined in future studies. To our knowledge,
however, our data are the first to describe how people perceive
the distinction between those influences that are appropriate and
those that are undue in the context of everyday decision-making,
and thus are an important initial step in providing insight into
the folk conception of autonomy.
In particular, these observations provide novel insights into
the phenomenology of agency, by exploring the degree to which
people perceive that they retain control over their decision-
making while navigating the real world in which decisions
will often be influenced by external agents. Without explicitly
querying public sentiments about free will, these experiments
shed light upon the degree to which people view autonomous
decisions as being caused entirely of their own accord, and the
conditions under which outside influences may be integrated into
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 August 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1400
fpsyg-09-01400 August 7, 2018 Time: 17:35 # 9
Niker et al. Attitudes About Influences on Autonomous Decision Making
one’s decision-making while still preserving perceived autonomy,
an issue that we expand upon below.
Recent debate among theorists of autonomy has centered
on the tension between our social ties and our ability to
make our own decisions. While the debate in academic
circles has been searching for a nuanced answer to how
to understand which social and relational influences support
the development and exercise of autonomy and which others
hinder it (Dworkin, 1988; Friedman, 2003), popular culture
has continued to proliferate an overly individualistic view of
autonomy. Our finding that, regardless of how individualistic
they identified as (on the communitarian-individualist scale),
people perceive an influence from a PREAUTHORIZED agent
as less undue than the identical influence from a NON-
PREAUTHORIZED agent is all the more interesting in light of
this persistent cultural glorification of the rugged individual
making decisions “for himself, by himself ” (Callero, 2013;
Brownlee, 2017). Our data suggest that people tend to see
through this “myth of individualism” (Code, 2016) when
considering how they navigate their own lives; instead, they
appear to ascribe to a more relational conception of autonomy,
which understands autonomous decision-making as partly
conditional on the cultivation of the types of relationships
and interpersonal contexts that can support its realization
(Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000; Specker Sullivan and Niker,
2018).
We suggest, then, that the folk conception of autonomy
aligns with recent trends in the philosophical debate toward
social and relational conceptions of autonomy. The data
suggest that people experience influences from those they
have preauthorized (in this domain) as something that
does not negatively affect the control that they perceive
themselves to have over their decision-making processes. In
certain situations (such as in our healthy eating scenario),
arational influences from a preauthorized source are perceived
as less objectionable and more welcome than a rational influence
from a non-preauthorized source. This finding highlights
the relationship between conscious cognitive processes and
control over one’s behavior in a way that supports our
theoretical conception of preauthorization as “a process by
which an individual gives a certain agent preferential access
to influencing her decision-making processes” (Niker et al.,
2016, p. 27). Whether we do so explicitly or as a form of
tacit knowledge (Cianciolo et al., 2006), we suggest that
the act of preauthorization represents an adaptive cognitive
process: the brain evaluates external agents and classifies them
by how reliable their information may be. Once “tagged”
in this way, it is plausible that the skeptical filter that we
apply to information deriving from preauthorized sources is
relaxed, making it easier for these sources to influence our
decision-making.
Our data are also relevant for applied debates, such as the
public policy debate over the ethics of using “nudges” to modify
citizens’ behavior (Hausman and Welch, 2010; Grune-Yanoff,
2012; Niker, 2018). Nudges are small changes to the environment,
or “choice architecture,” designed to promote particular welfare-
promoting choices without coercively limiting the range of
options (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). Although data on public
attitudes alone cannot resolve the relevant ethical questions, the
debate over the permissibility of nudging should at least be
informed by whether, and to what extent, people perceive nudges
to be undue influences on their decision making (Sunstein,
2016b). Previous studies have shown that people prefer overt to
covert nudges (Felsen et al., 2013), as well as nudges that appeal
to “System 2” rather than “System 1” thinking (Jung and Mellers,
2016; Sunstein, 2016a) – in both cases because the former are
considered less manipulative. Consistent with these observations,
our data demonstrate that people perceive RATIONAL influences
as less undue than ARATIONAL influences, whether they are
in the form of nudges (healthy eating scenario) or advice
(voting scenario). Together, these studies strongly suggest that
nudges that at least allow individuals to enlist cognitive resources
consistent with reasoning before making a decision are perceived
of as less undue than those that influence decision-making in a
less transparent fashion.
More distinctively, our results suggest that the relationship
between the nudger and nudged is also likely to play an important
role in determining attitudes about the acceptability of behavior-
modification interventions. We suggest that preauthorization –
not simply familiarity but having a shared worldview with the
influencing agent – is one of the factors explaining why certain
nudges may be perceived as more or less welcome depending
on which agent deploys them. Consequently, our results may
partially explain the phenomenon of partisan nudge bias, whereby
attitudes toward particular policy goals or policymakers – i.e.,
whether they align with the actor’s goals and commitments –
affect attitudes about the acceptability of the policy itself
(Tannenbaum et al., 2017).
Additionally, actors may not only preauthorize but also anti-
preauthorize certain agents. For example, individuals who are
committed to getting their news from one (partisan) news source
might actively ignore information from another (opposingly
partisan) news source, perhaps because the information may
be perceived as unduly influencing their beliefs. Although we
did not explicitly test this hypothesis, the results of two recent
surveys support this idea (Media Insight Project, 2017; Silverman,
2017). Indeed, in concert with confirmation bias (Nickerson,
1998), preauthorization may readily lead to the development
of so-called “echo chambers” in which we lend added credence
to information that derives from those with whom we share a
worldview while markedly discounting information from those
who we have flagged as having opposing viewpoints (Bessi et al.,
2016; Del Vicario et al., 2016; Editorial, 2017).
Such developments have real-world implications for
democracy in the age of social media, including the ethics
of the practice of “moral reframing,” in which political arguments
are framed to appeal to the values of those targeted for
persuasion (Feinberg and Willer, 2015), and the problems raised
by algorithmically-curated “filter bubbles.” These approaches
are effective at influencing decisions, and have been the
subject of recent debates over the power social media to shape
public opinion about critical topics like political campaigns.
Clarifying how these influences are perceived can help guide the
development of responsible online choice architecture.
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CONCLUSION
We have shown that external influences are perceived as
more or less undue depending upon socio-relational context.
Our empirical results about the folk conception of autonomy
align with well-developed philosophical arguments and provide
evidence that a new construct, preauthorization, plays a
role in the delicate dance between influencer and decision
maker.
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